Key Concepts

Threshold Decryption
Under the hood, TACo involves splitting a joint secret – a decryption key – into multiples shares and distributing those among authorized and collateralized node operators (stakers in the Threshold network). A minimum number – a threshold – of those operators holding the key shares must be online and actively participate in partial decryptions. These are subsequently combined on the requester's client to reconstruct the original plaintext data.
Conditions are 'attached' on a per-ciphertext basis. In other words, each and every payload, message or bit can be access-restricted by a unique set of specified conditions. In most situations, condition sets will be automatically reused until the end-user proactively configures them – for example, in order to remove an address from continuing to access the messages in a group chat. A range of access condition types can be defined by the data owner. For example:
  • EVM-based e.g. Does the requester own a given NFT?
  • RPC-driven e.g. Does the requester have at least X amount of a given token in their wallet?
  • Time-based e.g. Has a predefined period elapsed, after which requests will be ignored?
These conditions are also composable and can be combined in any logical sequence or decision tree.
Condition Fulfillment Verification
In most use cases, requesters prove their association with condition fulfillment – i.e. their right to receive a threshold number of decrypting shares – by signing a transaction that verifies their ownership of a given Ethereum wallet. That wallet is checked for fulfillment of the specific condition – e.g. owning an NFT in order to access a DAO's knowledge base.
This signature can be cached by the application for a use case-appropriate period of time, such that the user does not have to repeatedly re-sign for access later. However, verification still takes place in the background – for example, if a wallet address is removed from an NFT-gated group-chat by dint of changing the access-granting NFT, they will immediately be unable to see new messages. The cached signature will not give them access any longer than is specified by the data owner/encryptor.
Network Parameterization
In forthcoming versions, developers will have the option to tweak certain network-level parameters, which affect the collusion-resistance, redundancy, latency and costs of using TACo. These parameters mostly pertain to each cohort of nodes tasked with key material management and condition verification:
  • The number of decrypting shares n i.e. the size of the cohort
  • The frequency and/or business logic for replacing members of the cohort
  • The 'hand-chosen' node address that will always feature in the cohort
  • The sampling mechanism for selecting cohort members
This optionality can also be surfaced for end-users – for example, in the form of 'packages' that combine network-level parameters. End-users might choose between a few discrete options, based on their trust, risk and cost preferences.